St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice &
Ethics
Volume 3

Number 1

Article 9

1-1-2013

Guilt by Association: How “Standby Co-Counsel” Exposes
Attorneys to Malicious Prosecution Liability.
Colleen V. Lisowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej
Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colleen V. Lisowski, Guilt by Association: How “Standby Co-Counsel” Exposes Attorneys to Malicious
Prosecution Liability., 3 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 284 (2013).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej/vol3/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

CASE NOTE
Colleen V. Lisowski
Guilt by Association: How “Standby Co-Counsel” Exposes
Attorneys to Malicious Prosecution Liability

CONTENTS
I. Procedural Background and Party Identification . . . 288
A. Christopher Cole, Peregrine, and Unhappy
Shareholders: How It All Started . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
B. Bains v. Moores: The Six-Year Meritless
Derivative Suit and the Role of Standby
Co-Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
C. Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates—
Cole Sues All Counsels of Record in Bains . . . . . 291
D. Malicious Prosecution, Anti-SLAPP
Motions, and the Trial Court’s Ruling . . . . . . . . 291
II. What Not to Do—Learning from the Defendants’
Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
A. Argument 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
B. Argument 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
C. Argument 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
III. Analysis of the Court’s Decision: A Rejection of
the Passive Co-Counsel Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A. The Duties of All Co-Counsel and Division
of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
284

2013]

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

CASE NOTES

285

B. Sycamore Ridge Apartments
LLC v. Naumann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
The Ethical Role of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Policy Implications: What Is the Harm in Letting
Non-Participating Attorneys Escape Liability? . . . . . 304
Solutions for Avoiding Co-Counsel
Conundrums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

Beware of “co-counsel” risks. That is the clear message in the California
appellate decision, Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates1—a high-profile
malicious prosecution case—and a warning to plaintiffs’ attorneys who
play a “standby” trial counsel role.2 Cole is a cautionary tale involving two
attorneys who allowed their names to be listed on litigation pleadings, yet
never participated in the actual case. Essentially, they were standby cocounsel, meaning they agreed to assist only if the case proceeded to trial.3
The case never made it to trial; instead, the defendant subsequently sued
all attorneys listed as counsel of record for malicious prosecution.4 The
standby attorneys adamantly stressed their complete lack of involvement:
“It is axiomatic that where there has been no act, there can be no
liability.”5 Ultimately, Cole rejected this “passive counsel” defense,6 and
the court stated that the associated attorneys still had a duty to research the
validity of the case.7 Specifically, Justice Norman L. Epstein held:

1. Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Assocs., APC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (Ct. App. 2012), pet.
denied (Aug. 29, 2012).
2. See Robert P. Ottilie’s Reply to Christopher Cole’s Answer to the Petition at 7, Cole, 142
Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. S203895), 2012 WL 4006263 (criticizing the opinion because it “eviscerates
the longstanding practice in the legal profession of associating counsel for limited purpose”).
3. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663–64 (describing the defendants’ roles in the underlying
case).
4. Id. at 651.
5. Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 1, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
4073521; see also Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663–66 (discussing the defendants’ arguments).
6. The “passive defense” asserts that attorneys should not be liable for malicious prosecution if
they never participated in the case, despite their status as counsel of record. For example, the
defendants in this case described their passivity and detailed that they “did not draft or sign any
pleadings or motions, propound or answer any written discovery, participate in any depositions,
make any decisions regarding strategy, or discuss, accept, reject, analyze, or implement any strategy.”
Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 27–28, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
4073521.
7. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663 (describing the duty of care the counsel of record owes to
their client).
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[A]ttorneys who appear on all of the pleadings and papers filed for the
plaintiffs in [an] underlying case cannot avoid liability for malicious
prosecution merely by showing that they took a passive role in that case as
standby counsel who would try the case in the event it went to trial.8

Already deemed a “Blockbuster decision” due to its “far-ranging
ramifications and implications,” Ronald E. Mallen, a professional liability
expert, cautioned that the decision “should create waves of concern for
plaintiffs’ lawyers.”9 For example, consider the common practice (often
used in consumer litigation and class actions) where a small plaintiffs’ firm
enlists the help of a more prominent trial attorney.10 In these situations,
Cole will “create liability for all co-counsel who are merely identified in an
action as co-counsel and have no responsibility to do anything until called
upon to perform their limited role at trial.”11 As a result, these
arrangements are discouraged “because it makes trial attorneys potentially
liable for pretrial errors committed by other lawyers”12 and attorneys do
not want “to pick up that exposure.”13 Furthermore, this case raises
precedent and policy issues.14 One defense attorney criticized the holding
8. Id. at 651.
9. Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for Malicious
Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at
414 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/.
10. The Respondents argued:
This arrangement is a common practice among California lawyers, and particularly with lawyers
who specialize in representing plaintiffs, but who practice individually or in small firms . . . .
[It] represents a division of labor that permits the lead counsel to have access . . . to the expertise
or skills of another attorney who is known to the lead counsel.
Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 21, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 407352;
see also Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for Malicious
Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at
414 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/ (discussing the
common practice of dividing power).
11. Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 3, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
407352.
12. See Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for
Malicious Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 14, at 414 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/
(referring to Ronald E. Mallen’s interpretation of the decision).
13. See id. (summarizing Ronald E. Mallen’s predictions regarding how Cole will affect
attorneys).
14. The lower court raised economic concerns, deeming it “defensive medicine”:
The policy of the law wouldn’t seem to support the shifting of fees when the standby counsel’s
doing nothing but protecting themselves from malicious prosecution liability. In a different
context, that’s called defensive medicine, where doctors or healthcare providers do tests which
may not be indicated but which are appropriately done in order to leave a paper trail showing
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as “unrealistic” and “unfair” because “[i]t makes trial lawyers liable through
osmosis for everything a ‘workup’ lawyer has done.”15
At the opposite spectrum, others suggest the Cole decision does not
drastically change the legal landscape. Taking a back-to-basics approach,
Cole’s attorney commented on the outcome:
All the opinion does is reaffirm what has always been the law: that an
attorney has an obligation—to his client, to the court, and to his
adversaries—to ensure that he has a minimal level of probable cause to
support the claims, and the probable cause standard is not a particularly high
standard.16

This case is significant because it challenges the common practice of
including additional well-known attorneys in pleadings.17 This Case Note
focuses on how the Cole ruling impacts co-counsel liability for malicious
prosecution, and provides guidance and risks for practitioners to consider
before associating with a case.18 A lengthy procedural history involving
numerous parties prompted this malicious prosecution case, and
understanding this background is essential. Accordingly, Section I
summarizes the background, and clearly sets out the role each party played
in the case. Section II delves into the appellate arguments advanced by the
defendants, and analyzes their mistakes for practical lessons regarding what
not to do as co-counsel. The court’s decision is discussed in Section III,
which emphasizes the duties of co-counsel attorneys and discusses the
court’s reliance on precedent to strengthen its holding. Section IV
analyzes the ethical implications of using co-counsel collaboration as a
that you hadn’t fallen below the standard of care.
Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 54, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 407352
(agreeing with the lower court’s analysis).
15. See Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for
Malicious Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 14, at 416 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/
(reporting the outrage expressed by James J. Kjar, an attorney for one of the defendants in the case).
16. See id. (emphasizing how the hyperbole surrounding the decision may be unrealistic).
17. This case is also significant because it broadens the applicability of malicious prosecution,
which “has traditionally been regarded as a disfavored cause of action.” See Sheldon Appel Co. v.
Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 501–02 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (“Although the malicious prosecution
tort has ancient roots, courts have long recognized that the tort has the potential to impose an undue
‘chilling effect’ on the ordinary citizen’s willingness to report criminal conduct or to bring a civil
dispute to court, and, as a consequence, the tort has traditionally been regarded as a disfavored cause
of action.”).
18. This is a multi-faceted case that also deals with other interesting legal issues, but this Case
Note focuses solely on those pertaining to liability for malicious prosecution when the associated
attorneys did not participate in the underlying case.
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show of power, and cautions attorneys to understand the risks of power
tactics. Section V suggests policy implications of holding co-counsel liable
for malicious prosecution despite non-participation in the underlying case.
Finally, Section VI offers several solutions that attorneys can implement to
avoid facing co-counsel conundrums of their own.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
A. Christopher Cole, Peregrine, and Unhappy Shareholders: How It All
Started
Christopher A. Cole is the central figure in this analysis.19 In 1981, he
founded a computer software industry (Peregrine) and held various
management positions in the company.20 After resigning in 1989, his
involvement in Peregrine was limited to serving as an outside director and
shareholder.21 Fast-forward to 2002 when “improper transactions came to
light” regarding Peregrine company practices; this triggered an
independent investigation documented in an extensive report (referred to
as the Latham Report).22 Fortunately for Cole, the report cleared him of
any wrongdoing.23 However, Peregrine did not fare as well in the Latham
19. Cole was the defendant and target of a class action suit (discussed in further detail in
Section I) and then became the plaintiff in Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, which is the focus of
this Case Note. Thus, the following is a brief overview of his background:
Cole has spent his entire adult life in the computer-software industry, and founded Peregrine
Systems, Inc. (“Peregrine”) in 1981. Prior to that time, Cole attended college at Harvard
University, and pursued post-graduate studies at California Institute of Technology while
employed by IBM. Before Peregrine’s incorporation, it was a partnership that Cole formed with
other former IBM employees.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7–8, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634
(citations omitted).
20. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.
21. Id.; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712),
2011 WL 3268634 (explaining Cole resigned because his “technology skills were less relevant to
Peregrine’s needs” and stating he “ceased to have any employment, consulting or other relationship
with Peregrine” other than as an outside board member and shareholder).
22. “This report was based on approximately 86 interviews, 897,000 e-mail messages generated
between 1996 and 2002, and analysis of 170 suspect transactions.” Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 652.
23. See id. (noting the absence of any “evidence that the outside directors knew of
management’s improper business and accounting practices” and stating “Cole had sold Peregrine
stock whenever trading was allowed”); see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr.
3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634 (exonerating portions of the report that favored Cole).
Not only was Cole cleared of any wrongdoing, but the report went a step further and observed: “The
Board and Audit Committee acted appropriately when accounting or management integrity issues
came to their attention. Even with the benefit of hindsight, there is no basis to assign blame to the
Outside Directors [Cole being one of them] for Peregrine’s accounting or disclosure problems.”
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Report, as it revealed “massive accounting fraud.”24 Soon after this report,
Peregrine filed for bankruptcy, which “caused more than $4 billion in
shareholder losses and triggered a string of federal prosecutions against
corporate executives.”25
B. Bains v. Moores:26 The Six-Year Meritless Derivative Suit and the Role
of Standby Co-Counsel
Although the Latham Report cleared Cole of any wrongdoing, this did
not protect him from becoming the target of angry shareholders.27 In
2003, Cole and other Peregrine directors were charged with securities
fraud, insider trading, negligent misrepresentation, and a slew of related
claims in Bains v. Moores,28 a class action lawsuit filed on the shareholders’
behalf.29 Cole was allegedly the mastermind behind the fraudulent
Peregrine scheme with “day-to-day control over its operations.”30
Bains is significant because all of the relevant parties (and future
defendants) entered the scene. Specifically, attorneys Patricia A. Meyer
and Michael Aguirre filed the complaint, and they recruited two
prominent trial attorneys as standby co-counsel—Raymond P. Boucher31
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634.
Furthermore, Cole joined with other directors to initiate an independent investigation as soon as he
was aware of possible misconduct, “even though the aftermath left him holding over a million shares
of now-worthless Peregrine stock.” Id. at 11.
24. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9–10, Cole, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634 (reporting senior management “engage[d] in
improper accounting and undisclosed balance sheet manipulation” and “encouraged senior Sales
executives to pursue transactions that were designed to achieve a superficial appearance of revenue,
but lacked economic substance”).
25. Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for Malicious
Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at
414 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/.
26. Bains III v. Moores, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309 (Ct. App. 2009). For the remainder of the
analysis, this case will be referred to as Bains.
27. “The class action was brought on behalf of a group of Peregrine shareholders who allegedly
lost $13 million.” Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for
Malicious Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 14, at 414 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/.
28. Bains III v. Moores, No. GIC806212, 2007 WL 6830423 (San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct.
granted summary judgment Dec. 13, 2007), aff’d by Bains III v. Moores, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309 (Ct.
App. 2009).
29. Bains, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313–14 (providing procedural background).
30. Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Assocs., APC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646, 652 (Ct. App. 2012),
pet. denied (Aug. 29, 2012).
31. Boucher is a partner of Kiesel, Boucher & Larson, LLP in Los Angeles, which was also
listed as counsel of record, collectively referred to as “Boucher” throughout this Case Note.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634.
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and Robert P. Ottilie.32 It is important to understand the crucial
difference in the roles each party played in Bains: Meyer and Aguirre were
responsible for all preliminary matters, while Boucher and Ottilie were
listed as co-counsel, but would participate in the case only if it proceeded
to trial.33 Boucher and Ottilie’s role as standby co-counsel is particularly
relevant to this analysis.
Bains never made it to trial. In fact, the lawsuit did not even survive
summary judgment.34 Though Cole was victorious, it was not a quick
feat.35 Christopher A. Cole endured over six years of meritless allegations
before the appellate court finally dismissed the case.36 The record listed
Boucher and Ottilie as co-counsel throughout the entire process, but they
never participated because the case did not proceed to trial.37
32. Ottilie became an attorney in 1980 and was a solo practitioner during the relevant periods
of this case. Id.
33. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663 (explaining the parties’ relationships).
34. See Bains, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318–27 (explaining the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact), aff’g No. GIC806212, 2007 WL 6830423 (San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct. order
granting summary judgment Dec. 13, 2007); see also Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 653 (supporting
summary judgment because “even the plaintiffs’ expert did not conclude the outside directors [Cole]
knew of the fraud”).
35. The original Bains complaint was filed in 2003, and the final appellate decision affirming
the summary judgment was decided six years later in 2009. See Bains, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313
(providing the 2003 initial filing date).
36. The Bains case was filed in February 2003, the appellate court affirmed the summary
judgment on March 20, 2009, and the petition to review was denied on July 8, 2009. After a lengthy
four-year span, the trial court granted Cole’s motion for summary judgment in 2007 and held that
the suit lacked merit because there was no evidence that outside directors knew of the fraudulent
accounting practice. See id. at 315–16 (summarizing the trial court’s decision to grant a summary
judgment). The fraud claims “required proof that [Cole] had made statements that [he] knew to be
false, or that [Cole] had made with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Id. at 315. The
plaintiffs’ evidence was rejected by the trial court because it did not show “defendants intended to
defraud,” nor did it establish “that they, as outside directors, had knowledge of the fraud.” Id. at
316. On the other hand, Cole provided “direct evidence” that he was unaware of the fraud “at the
time he signed various financial statements.” Id. at 315. Specifically, the defendants signed certain
statements based on “recommendations of Peregrine’s in-house counsel, outside counsel, and [an]
outside accounting firm.” Id. at 315–16. Two years later, the appellate court affirmed Cole’s
summary judgment in 2009. See id. at 318 (concluding the appellants failed to provide evidence to
raise a genuine issue of fact as to Cole’s knowledge of the fraud, and also rejecting the appellant’s
contention regarding the scienter and intent elements of fraud).
37. See id. at 313 (listing the attorneys representing each party, including Boucher and Ottilie).
At the time the trial court granted Cole’s summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ attorneys, including
Boucher and Ottilie, had no shortage of access to materials:
(a) Lantham’s interview memoranda of 102 individual witnesses; (b) electronic records
assembled by Peregrine, consisting of 897,000 emails, of which 502,000 were unique, and
151,000 email attachments, all in searchable databases; (c) over 200 boxes of documents
produced by Peregrine to U.S. government investigators, comprising 740,298 pages of
documents, as well as a separate collection of electronic documents; (d) the depositions of 14
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C. Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates38—Cole Sues All Counsels of
Record in Bains
A bit of justice (or revenge) was in order. Not surprisingly, Cole
commenced his own action for malicious prosecution in Cole v. Patricia A.
Meyer & Associates in 2010 and sued every attorney listed as counsel of
record in the Bains action.39 Who did this include? Meyer and Aguirre
were obvious defendants due to their work on all preliminary matters. But
an interesting twist, and the focal point of this Case Note, resulted from
Cole’s inclusion of the two prominent standby attorneys—Boucher and
Ottilie—even though they did not actually work on the Bains case. Their
mere listing as counsel of record was enough for Cole to include them in
the suit.40
D. Malicious Prosecution, Anti-SLAPP Motions, and the Trial Court’s
Ruling
All four attorney-defendants relied on California’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation)41 law to dismiss the malicious
prosecution claims.42 To overcome an anti-SLAPP motion, Cole had to
make a prima facie showing he would prevail on the malicious prosecution

other witnesses in the bankruptcy case; (e) the depositions of 35 additional witnesses taken in
pending civil cases; (f) written responses to 16 separate discovery requests; and (g) detailed
admissions from four of the eight indicted officers of Peregrine in their respective plea
agreements.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634.
However, Boucher and Ottilie never looked at any of this material to assess whether the case was
based on meritorious claims. Suppose one of them so much as peeked at a few pages of this material,
could they have dissuaded Meyer and Aguirre from continuing their action against Cole or from even
filing the action? Indeed, such knowledge is unascertainable, but it is possible that court costs and
time could have been drastically reduced.
38. Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Assocs., APC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (Ct. App. 2012), pet.
denied (Aug. 29, 2012).
39. Id. at 651.
40. At the time Cole filed this malicious prosecution suit, he was unaware Boucher and Ottilie
had not taken an active role in the Bains case because they had not alerted “the court and opposing
counsel of their limited involvement in the case.” Id. at 666.
41. Id. at 651 n.1.
42. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 2012) (“A cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or
free speech . . . in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.”). The anti-SLAPP motion to strike is a remedy for the “disturbing increase in
lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
petition for the redress of grievances.” Id. § 425.16(a).
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claims.43 Thus, Cole had to prove the Bains action was: (1) brought
without probable cause,44 and (2) initiated with malice.45 The trial court
allowed Cole to proceed against Meyer and Aguirre; yet dealt Cole a major
setback regarding Boucher and Ottilie.46
Agreeing with Boucher and Ottilie, the lower court granted their
motions to strike.47 The trial judge ruled they did not have a duty to
investigate whether probable cause existed for the Bains case: “[T]he legal
profession, in its custom and practice, does not require co-counsel who is
not actively participating in litigation to investigate and independently
43. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655–56 (discussing the requirements necessary to defeat an
anti-SLAPP motion to strike); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 2012)
(providing a plaintiff can defeat the motion by “establish[ing] that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail”).
44. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655 (providing an overview of probable cause as it relates to
malicious prosecution). The court clarified that “[p]robable cause exists when a lawsuit is based on
facts reasonably believed to be true, and all asserted theories are legally tenable under the known
facts.” Id. (citing Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 139 P.3d 30, 51 (Cal. 2006)). If Cole
could prove “any one of the theories in Bains was legally untenable or based on facts not reasonably
believed to be true,” then he would prevail. Id.
45. The court elaborated on the malice requirement and explained it “does not require that the
defendants harbor actual ill will toward the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution case,” and it can be
inferred from a range of attitudes, such as “open hostility to indifference.” Id. at 661. Various
scenarios may be considered to determine whether “malice” occurred, including the following: “the
defendants’ lack of probable cause, supplemented with proof that the prior case was instituted largely
for an improper purpose” or the “evidence that the prior case was knowingly brought without
probable cause”; and the “investigation and research” of an attorney may also be included in the
malice analysis. Id. Another possibility would require Cole to “show[] that [Boucher and Ottilie]
maliciously continued to prosecute the case against him, in the trial court and on appeal, without
probable cause.” Id. at 655 (emphasis added) (citing Zamos v. Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 807 (Cal.
2004)). In 2004, the California Supreme Court examined a question of first impression: whether a
defendant could be held liable for malicious prosecution by simply continuing a lawsuit, even though
the defendant had not initiated it. Zamos, 87 P.3d at 807. In Zamos, the court acknowledged that
malicious prosecution is considered a “disfavored cause of action,” but cautioned that its stigma
should not defeat legitimate claims. Id. at 807. The Zamos court found no reason to limit malicious
prosecution to the “initiation of a suit.” Id. “It makes little sense to hold attorneys accountable for
their knowledge when they file a lawsuit, but not for their knowledge the next day.” Id. at 809. In
other words, Boucher and Ottilie may not have technically initiated the suit, yet they also did not do
anything to stop the meritless allegations. Worth noting, aside from malice and probable cause, a
third element of malicious prosecution is “favorable termination,” but that is not an issue in this case
as there was no dispute that Bains was terminated in favor of Cole. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
661 (listing the elements of malicious prosecution). Another interesting issue, though one not
analyzed in this Case Note, is the criticism that the Cole decision created a “new slippery slope
standard to determine malice.” See Robert P. Ottilie’s Reply to Christopher Cole’s Answer to the
Petition for Review at 8, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. BC436506), 2012 WL 4006263 (stressing
the opinion “glossed over” the malice element, and mistakenly removed the defendant’s subjective
intent from the malice analysis).
46. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651, 653 (recalling the 2010 action by the trial court).
47. Id.
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determine that the lead counsel has [probable] cause” for the underlying
claims.48 Dissatisfied with this result, Cole piqued legal interest by
presenting the appellate court with the following issue: whether nonparticipating, standby co-counsel can be held liable for malicious
prosecution by simply being listed as counsel of record.49
II. WHAT NOT TO DO—LEARNING FROM THE DEFENDANTS’ MISTAKES
Practitioners may be surprised to discover that Boucher and Ottilie were
ordinary attorneys doing something they had done for many years—they
agreed to be co-counsel if a case went to trial and agreed to be listed on the
pleadings. Many practitioners may be unknowingly making the same
mistakes as Boucher and Ottilie.
This section discusses the defendants’ three main arguments urging the
appellate court to shield them from malicious prosecution liability.
Although the appellate court rejected each argument (analysis provided in
Section III), they are useful as detailed guides of what not to do when
associating on a case. By understanding these flawed arguments, attorneys
can better understand their duties and risks when deciding whether to
become associated with a case as counsel of record.
A. Argument 1: We Did Not Have an Independent Duty to Assess Whether
Probable Cause Existed Because Our Role in the Case Was Limited to the
Trial Stage.
Simply put, this was the gist of their argument: We only agreed to enter
the scene if the case went to trial; this means that any and all pretrial issues
were not part of our duties.50 Both Boucher and Ottilie stressed their
non-participation in all preliminary matters, and asserted that the probable
cause determination was the sole duty of Meyer and Aguirre.51
For example, Boucher and the Meyer defendants had an agreed
arrangement where “one firm initiated and developed a case and the other

48. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 29, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
3268634 (quoting the lower court’s holding).
49. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651 (“Cole appeals the striking of his malicious prosecution
claims against the Boucher defendants and Ottilie.”); see also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 30, Cole,
142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634 (listing the issues on appeal).
50. See Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 54, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011
WL 4073521 (emphasizing that the lower court’s ruling correctly recognizes “the duty only arises
when co-counsel’s role in the litigation is initiated,” and arguing this is more in line with precedent).
51. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663–65 (summarizing the defendants’ arguments regarding
their limited roles in the case).
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firm tried it.”52 Applying this to the Bains case, Meyer and Aguirre were
responsible for all pretrial work, while Boucher remained completely
detached from all decision-making. Further emphasizing this passive role,
Boucher declared they “did not sign, draft, prepare, review, serve, approve,
or discuss the contents of any pleading in Bains or participate in the case in
any way.”53
Similarly, Ottilie asserted his “role was limited to assisting with trial”
and emphasized that he did not bill any time for the case.54 Ottilie urged
the court to consider his blatant lack of securities expertise, and how
absurd it would be “to suggest that Ottilie had a duty to oversee or secondguess the decisions” of Aguirre, who had far “superior technical expertise in
the esoteric area of securities law.”55 Essentially, he was incapable of
determining whether probable cause existed, which is precisely why he
deferred to Aguirre (“the expert securities litigator”) for such pretrial
matters.56
Additionally, the defendants argued that if all attorneys were required to
research the merits of the case, this would result in a conflict of interest.
An attorney would “perform[] extensive legal research, not for the benefit
of [the] client, but simply to protect himself from his client’s adversaries in
the event the suit fails.”57
How to avoid this mistake: Before associating with any case as counsel
of record, evaluate the allegations to ensure probable cause exists by asking
whether they are “based on facts not reasonably believed to be true” or
“whether ‘any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim
tenable.’”58 The duty to assess the merits is not particularly burdensome:
“It doesn’t mean you have to go through . . . 18 boxes of discovery, it
doesn’t mean you have to interview every witness. You just need to know
52. Id. at 663.
53. Id. Note, however, despite the defendants’ list of how they were not involved, the court
observed, “Boucher’s declaration did not indicate whether he or his law firm knew anything about
the Bains case.” Id.
54. See Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 5, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No.
B227712), 2011 WL 5238835 (“[I]t is undisputed that Ottilie never billed a single minute of
attorney time in the underlying case, again because his role was simply to be available to assist at trial
. . . . He simply waited to be called to assist, and the call never came.”).
55. Id. at 24.
56. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663.
57. Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 52–53, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011
WL 4073521 (relying on Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 509 (Cal. 1989), as
precedent for why attorneys’ research is irrelevant to probable cause, and creates bad policy).
58. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655 (quoting Sheldon, 765 P.2d at 511) (explaining the
objective standard of review and comparing it to the standard for assessing whether a lawsuit is
frivolous).
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that there are some facts that establish probable cause.”59
Additionally, do not assume that agreeing to be co-counsel for the sole
purpose of trial means your duties are postponed until the trial stage. As
Section III explains in detail, certain duties are triggered the moment an
attorney associates as co-counsel on a case.60 Once the defendants’ names
were listed as counsel of record, they were assumed to have already
determined probable cause existed to prosecute the case.61 “If this were
not so, an attorney could associate into a clearly unmeritorious case with
impunity, as long as the attorney was careful not to become familiar with
the claims or the evidence.”62
Both attorneys rattled off seemingly endless lists of tasks they did not do
in the case—drafting, analyzing, preparing, signing, and discussing. Yet
the court was more concerned with what they should have done.63
Attorneys may passively shirk tasks and take a hands-off approach, but
they cannot evade mandatory duties and avoid liability. The bottom line
is that attorneys should not associate with a case as counsel of record until
they have researched the merits to ensure probable cause exists.
B. Argument 2: Our Arrangement Was Based on a Permissible Division of
Power, and We Relied in Good Faith on Meyer and Aguirre Based on
Our Working Relationship.
Neither Boucher nor Ottilie researched whether probable cause existed;
at the same time, they were not mindlessly attaching their names to the
case. Instead, they wholeheartedly believed probable cause existed based
on their relationship with Meyer and Aguirre.64 Essentially, the thrust of
59. See Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for
Malicious Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 14, at 416 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/
(quoting Leighton M. Anderson, attorney for Christopher Cole) (downplaying the amount of effort
actually required to fulfill the duty of assessing whether probable cause exists).
60. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 665 (holding an attorney may be “liable for the very act of
associating into a case containing frivolous claims”).
61. See id. (reiterating what an attorney should do prior to becoming counsel of record,
including the duty to make a “preliminary determination whether probable cause exists” (quoting
Sycamore Ridge Apts. v. Naumann, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 579 (Ct. App. 2007))). To be clear, “[t]he
act of associating into a case as [co-counsel] carries with it at least the responsibility to be familiar
with the claims made by one’s clients in the litigation.” Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582.
62. Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582 n.13.
63. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 665 (finding no difference between “[m]aintaining a case one
knows, or should know, is untenable” (quoting Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582) (emphasis
added)).
64. The trial court was influenced by this argument when granting their anti-SLAPP motions.
See Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 6, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011
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their argument was based on a division of power: why waste money and
time assessing the underlying merits of Bains when that is precisely the job
of our trusted co-counsel, Meyer and Aguirre?65
Consider Ottilie’s working relationship with Aguirre: they had been
friends since the 1980s; they worked on a high-profile public funding case
for an NFL stadium, as well other pro bono matters; and Ottilie witnessed
Aguirre’s career develop over the course of twenty years, and was especially
impressed by Aguirre’s financial and securities successes.66 Throughout
Ottilie’s joint endeavors and personal experiences, Ottilie considered
Aguirre to be “a very hard worker and was always well prepared, and paid
acute attention to detail.”67 Thus, when Aguirre approached Ottilie and
requested assistance should the Bains case go to trial, Ottilie agreed to do
so based on their history—a long friendship, personal trust, working
relationship, successful professional career, and hard-working and
competent disposition. Ottilie had every reason to rely on Aguirre and no
reason to believe that he would prosecute a meritless case.
Similarly, Boucher knew Meyer and Aguirre for over ten years, and had
a long professional relationship with them.68 The parties commonly relied
on arrangements with other law firms, and Boucher’s attorney emphasized
that this case was no different:
[It was] a pattern and practice [that] the law firms had worked together in
the past with a clear division of labor. Meyer did all the prep work; Boucher
came in and tried the case. They did one, the reverse. So there was a pattern
and practice between these firms as to that division of labor.69

WL 5238835 (providing relevant portions of the lower court’s decision observing the parties’ good
faith reliance based on their relationship); see also Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 20–22, Cole, 142
Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 4073521 (also listing relevant portions of the lower
court’s decision and elaborating on why Cole would not prevail when asserting probable cause and
malice). However, as discussed in Section III, the Cole appellate court was not nearly as persuaded by
this argument.
65. Their confidence in this argument was likely bolstered by the fact that the trial court agreed
with this reasoning. “As found by the trial court, it would be uneconomic to require stand-by
counsel to ‘become sufficiently familiar with the facts and the law . . . in order to evaluate the filings
and other actions of lead counsel.’” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 29, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646
(No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634.
66. See Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 7–8, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No.
B227712), 2011 WL 5238835.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 33, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
4073521.
69. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 25–26, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011
WL 3268634 (echoing the argument asserted by the defendants) (citing transcripts from hearings
held on August 9, 2010 and August 18, 2010).
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Furthermore, they justified this division of labor using the California
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3-110(C) provided them with
authority because it “allows an attorney who lacks sufficient learning and
skill necessary to provide competent representation to associate with or
consult another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent.”70 The
defendants argued that deferring to other attorneys with superior expertise
is proper and in the best interest of the client and claimed that they were
actually providing better representation by dividing the power according to
skill.
Ottilie’s attorneys offered a cinematic reference to simplify this
argument: “‘Dirty Harry’ Callahan, a fictional Californian portrayed in
several films by Clint Eastwood, recognized famously: ‘A man’s gotta know
his limitations.’ California law requires lawyers to do the same thing.”71
How to avoid this mistake: Dirty Harry is only partially correct. As
discussed in further detail in Section III, an attorney must be informed
enough to assess the judgment of co-counsel.72 Although attorneys may
seek assistance and divide work with other attorneys, the duty of
competent representation remains wholly intact.73
Lessening the
workload is permissible, but attorneys should not assume this limits their
duties to the client.74 Thus, an attorney must not rely solely on another
attorney’s experience, expertise, friendship, or professional reputation; she
may be exceedingly intelligent and better-equipped to handle a case, but
the counsel of record must still remain sufficiently informed to judge other
attorneys’ quality of work.
In this case, Boucher and Ottilie had no reason to believe Meyer and
Aguirre would vigorously prosecute a meritless case. However, a good
faith belief alone is insufficient; attorneys must have a requisite familiarity
with the subject matter of the case.75 Reviewing the Bains case, Judge
70. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664 (citing CAL. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3110(C) (Deering Supp. 2012)).
71. See Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 23–24, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No.
B227712), 2011 WL 5238835 (internal citation omitted) (providing reasons why Ottilie’s reliance
on Aguirre was reasonable based on his limited knowledge of securities litigation).
72. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664 (“But even when work on a case is performed by an
experienced attorney, competent representation still requires knowing enough about the subject matter
to be able to judge the quality of the attorney’s work.”) (emphasis added); see also CAL. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-110(B) (Deering Supp. 2012) (defining the elements of
competence as “1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability
reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.”).
73. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664.
74. Id.
75. See id. (interpreting how the California Rules of Professional Conduct relate to this case).
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Epstein described it as mere “allegations for the most part [that] consisted
of inferences from circumstantial evidence couched as statements of
ultimate fact.”76 If Boucher and Ottilie were familiar with the subject
matter, they may have questioned Meyer’s and Aguirre’s judgment
regarding the pursuit of baseless allegations.77
C. Argument 3: All We Did Was Allow Our Names on Some Pleadings. No
Authority Exists to Hold Us Liable When We Never Actually Participated
in the Case.
Simply stated, Boucher argued that authority is non-existent to hold
them liable for malicious prosecution solely on the basis that their names
appeared on the filings. The argument asked the court: under what
authority could we possibly be held liable for malicious prosecution when
we never actively prosecuted or participated in the case?78 The court had
no trouble responding with precedent, which is discussed below in Section
III.
How to avoid this mistake: Attorneys should not assume that lending
their name to a case is a risk-free practice. If it is a meritless action and the
defendant subsequently sues for malicious prosecution, any attorney listed
as counsel of record may be liable. An attorney can argue that he was
sailing around the world for the entirety of the case and had no inkling of
participation in the decisions, yet if listed as counsel of record then he is
not precluded from malicious prosecution liability.79 Attorneys have a
duty to diligently research and remain informed about the subject matter
of the case, and should not downplay the court’s willingness to hold them
to a high standard regarding such duties.80 Though Cole is a California
appellate court holding, other courts will likely rely on its reasoning for
guidance when faced with similar issues.

76. Id. at 661. The court provides examples of some of the “more serious” allegations: “Cole
was actively involved in the day-to-day operations at Peregrine, worked closely with the company’s
CEO to establish its business model, attended operational meetings, and was instrumental in
establishing sales and revenue forecasts.” Id. Thus, Boucher and Ottilie did not have to be highly
skilled in any specialized area to investigate whether probable cause existed for such allegations; yet
they made no attempts to familiarize themselves with the case.
77. See id. at 665 (noting that Boucher and Ottilie lacked the requisite knowledge).
78. See id. at 664–65 (“The Boucher defendants argue that there is no authority for holding
them liable for maliciously initiating or prosecuting the case against Cole just because their names
appeared on the filings in Bains because they did not actively participate in the case.”).
79. See id. at 664 (prohibiting defendants from escaping “liability for malicious prosecution by
claiming to have been ignorant of the merits of the allegations”).
80. Id. at 663–65 (explaining duties as counsel of record).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION: A REJECTION OF THE PASSIVE
CO-COUNSEL DEFENSE
The appellate court sharply disagreed with the defendants, and Judge
Epstein explained: “[W]e cannot conclude as a matter of law that these
attorneys may avoid liability for malicious prosecution by learning nothing
or close to nothing about the Bains case, throughout which they allowed
themselves to be consistently identified as counsel of record for the
plaintiffs.”81 Although the defendants stressed their lack of involvement
and detachment, Judge Epstein observed that as co-counsel they were
intimately tied to the case throughout its duration:
Ottilie and [Boucher] were identified in Bains as “[a]ttorneys for [p]laintiffs”
along with Meyer [and Aguirre]. They apparently were listed as counsel for
the plaintiffs on all filings in Bains, including the appellate briefs filed after
the summary judgment . . . . [D]efense filings in Bains were served on all
counsel of record. There is no evidence that Ottilie and [Boucher] objected
to service or notified the court or opposing counsel that they did not actually
represent the Bains plaintiffs.82

The following subsections discuss cautionary lessons gleaned from the
court’s decision. Most importantly, the “passive, standby co-counsel”
defense cannot be used as an escape route for performing certain duties,
nor can it shield attorneys from malicious prosecution liability.
A. The Duties of All Co-Counsel and Division of Power
What about the defendants’ argument that no duty existed? The court
vitiated this logic by explicitly stating a counsel of record is automatically
accompanied with a “duty of care to [his or her] clients that encompasse[s]
‘both a knowledge of the law and an obligation of diligent research and
informed judgment.’”83
Acknowledging that California law permits attorneys to divvy up duties
with attorneys of record,84 Epstein draws a sharp distinction—allowing a
division of labor between attorneys is not to be confused with allowing “an
81. Id. at 663.
82. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, Epstein seems to agree with the assertion that “it is unlikely
to the point of incredulity that Ottilie and Boucher Defendants were completely unaware of the facts
and circumstances of the case as it evolved—and as the adverse rulings piled up.” Appellant’s
Opening Brief at 54, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634 (emphasis
added).
83. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663 (quoting Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct.
App. 1975)).
84. See id. at 664 (“California law generally allows an attorney of record to associate with
another attorney and to divide the duties of conducting the case.”).
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associated attorney whose name appears on all filings [to] be able to avoid
liability by intentionally failing to learn anything about a case that may
turn out to have been maliciously prosecuted in whole or in part.”85
Thus, even when an experienced attorney (such as Aguirre) works on a
portion of the case, other associated attorneys (such as Ottilie and
Boucher) have a duty to continue to provide “competent
representation.”86 This means they must “know[] enough about the
subject matter to be able to judge the quality of the attorney’s work.”87
The defendants asserted the Dirty Harry “know your limitations”
argument by claiming clients are benefitted when attorneys divide tasks
and defer to highly-skilled co-counsel.88 However, Judge Epstein would
likely tell Dirty Harry to join Boucher and Ottilie in the liability hot
seat.89 The Cole decision provides insight into the Dirty Harry fallacy
regarding competent representation—mainly that it misleadingly omits the
crucial requirement of “knowing enough.”90 To clarify, it is not sufficient
for an attorney to know their own limitations (e.g., lack of securities
expertise) if they fail to “know enough” about the case. For example, both
defendants recognized their limits, yet Boucher “knew nothing about the
merits” and Ottilie did not know enough about the asserted theories.91
This lack of knowledge left them incapable of judging the work of other
attorneys, and incapable of satisfying the duty to provide competent
representation.92
Further, not only did Ottilie and Boucher owe a duty to their clients,
but as attorneys they had “a responsibility to avoid frivolous or vexatious
litigation.”93 Relying on a Ninth Circuit case,94 Epstein rejected “willful
85. Id.
86. See id. (clarifying that competent representation is still required “even when work on a case
is performed by an experienced attorney”).
87. Id.
88. Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 23–24, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No.
B227712), 2011 WL 5238835.
89. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664 (responding to the defendants’ argument that California
Rules of Professional Conduct do not require that they remain informed after dividing duties).
90. Id.
91. Id. (pointing to the defendants’ own declarations as evidence that they did not know
enough about the case).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7(b) (Deering Supp. 2012) (explaining an
attorney who “presents” a pleading to the court “impliedly certifies its legal and factual merit”)).
Section 128.7(b) mandates attorneys should ensure they are only presenting the court with
meritorious claims “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . .” See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7(b)(1–4)
(Deering Supp. 2012) (listing four conditions that attorneys must consider before presenting to the
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ignorance” as a defense.95 Nor did it matter that the defendants never
personally signed any of the filings: “[T]he Boucher defendants and Ottilie
lent their names to all filings in that case, supporting an inference that they
‘presented’ these filings to the court and thus initiated and prosecuted
Bains along with the Meyer defendants.”96
B. Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann97
Responding to the assertion that no authority could possibly support a
holding disfavoring the defendants, the Cole appellate court relied on
Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann. Also a malicious prosecution
case, Sycamore Ridge involved a landlord that was sued by apartment
tenants for poor living conditions and unfair business practices.98 In that
case, the LaFave attorneys became co-counsel for the limited “mold
exposure aspect of litigation,” and they associated with the case just one
month before it was dismissed.99 After the case was dismissed, the
landlord brought a malicious prosecution case against all of the attorneys
who represented the tenants in the prior case, including the LaFave
defendants.100
The Sycamore Ridge court ruled in favor of the landlord and wisely
cautioned: “Before agreeing to become attorney of record in a pending
case, an attorney should, at a minimum, be familiar with the client’s claims
and should have made a preliminary determination whether probable cause
exists to support the asserted claims of defenses.”101 The LaFave
defendants were only listed as co-counsel for one month and did not
participate in the case, yet the Sycamore Ridge court remained steadfast in
maintaining their limited involvement did not shield them from malicious
prosecution liability. “An attorney’s assertion that he or she did not
initiate a lawsuit and that his or her participation in the case was to be
limited in time and scope does not eliminate the attorney’s potential
liability for malicious prosecution.”102 “[T]he very act of associating into
court). Additionally, “presenting” can be in the form of “signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper.” Id. § 128.7(b).
94. In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010).
95. See Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664 (relying on the holding provided by In re Girardi, which
stated the plaintiffs’ co-counsel could not use “willful ignorance” as a defense).
96. Id.
97. Sycamore Ridge Apts. LLC v. Naumann, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561 (Ct. App. 2007).
98. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 665 (citing Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561).
99. Id. (quoting Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561).
100. Id. (citing Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561).
101. Id. (quoting Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 579) (alteration in original).
102. Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 582.
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a case containing frivolous claims”103 is a low threshold for malicious
prosecution liability, yet the Cole appellate court found support in
Sycamore Ridge to strengthen its holding.104 Thus, Judge Epstein had no
qualms holding Boucher and Ottilie liable for malicious prosecution
despite a lack of any actual participation in the case, especially since the
circumstances in Cole seemed “more egregious than those of the LaFave
defendants in Sycamore Ridge.”105
IV. THE ETHICAL ROLE OF POWER
Boucher’s counsel remarked to the trial court judge: “[Y]ou know,
Kiesel, Boucher and Larson. It’s a big firm. They’ve got a big name.
Maybe their placing their name on [the Bains action] was designed for—to
show more power in the case.”106 Collaboration for power is a common
practice in the legal world.107
In the Cole appellate opinion, Judge Epstein raised eyebrows with his
discussion of power. Specifically, he questioned why Boucher and Ottilie
had to associate with Bains from the very beginning.108 Why did they
allow their names to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs on filings over
several years?109 Why did they fail to disclose their limited involvement to
the court or opposing party?110 The court observed that “no explanation
ha[d] been offered” for any of these questions, and Epstein concluded
“their premature association supports [the] inference” that Boucher and
Ottilie “associated with the case for an improper purpose, such as to ‘show
103. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 665.
104. See id. (analogizing the Sycamore Ridge facts with the instant case). Specifically, the court
draws a few parallels. “The LaFave defendants did nothing beyond associating as counsel [just like
Boucher and Ottilie].” Id. (citing Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561). Furthermore, “[t]heir
contemplated role was limited to the mold exposure aspect of the case [Boucher’s and Ottilie’s was
limited to trial] and was not triggered in the month after they associated into the case [Boucher’s and
Ottilie’s was never triggered].” Id. (citing Sycamore Ridge, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561). The court
concluded “Sycamore Ridge provides authority for holding an attorney liable for the very act of
associating into a case containing frivolous claims.” Id.
105. Id. at 666. But cf. Robert P. Ottilie’s Respondent’s Brief at 18–24, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr.
3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 5238835 (distinguishing Sycamore Ridge from the instant case and
downplaying its significance); Boucher Respondents’ Brief at 52–54, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646
(No. B227712), 2011 WL 4073521 (negating the similarities between Sycamore Ridge and Cole and
asserting that Sycamore Ridge should not be extended to impose liability on the defendants).
106. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 26, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
3268634 (citing transcripts from hearings held on August 9, 2010, and August 18, 2010).
107. Id. at 5 (noting that the trial court’s decision was based on this “common practice”).
108. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 666.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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more power.’”111
This prompted critics and commentators to ask a basic question: when
did collaboration with another attorney for the purpose of showing more
power become legally improper or unethical?112 Epstein’s baffling
conclusion, which was espoused in a short paragraph and unaccompanied
by sufficient explanation, opened the door for skepticism, criticism, and
confusion. Robert E. Mallen, a professional liability expert, stated:
“There’s no ethics rule I can think of under the ABA rules or under
California’s semi-unique rules that would prohibit that.”113
Another critique is simply that the court got it all wrong. The court’s
power analysis was completely backwards according to Ottilie’s attorney,
James J. Kjar. “The ethical duty to advocate zealously on a client’s behalf
may actually require an attorney to enlist the services of a good trial lawyer
to ‘show more power.’”114 The legal world is one of vast financial
disparities, so collaborating to show power is especially useful when
defendants have deeper pockets. Enrolling a prominent trial attorney as
co-counsel becomes a “great equalizer.”115 Plus, enlisting powerful
standby co-counsel is not an uncommon practice, and it has positive
effects. This is a technique to get the other side’s attention and is also a
method to “get these cases resolved.”116
In Epstein’s defense, perhaps his power stance should be interpreted in
light of the entire Cole opinion rather than in isolation.117 A more
reasonable interpretation is this: “Even if the practice is common, the
passive counsel of record should not be regarded as free of professional or
ethical responsibilities for clients, the opposing parties, or the judicial
system.”118 Epstein did not declare that enlisting well-known attorneys as
a power move is always improper. The show of power may be a proper,
ethical purpose so long as the associated parties diligently research and
111. Id.
112. See Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for
Malicious Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
No. 14, at 416 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/
(discussing the spectrum of views regarding whether power is an improper purpose).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (providing another critique by Ottilie’s attorney, James J. Kjar).
117. See Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Assocs., APC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646, 666 (Ct. App.
2012), pet. denied (Aug. 29, 2012) (representing Epstein’s brief discussion regarding the defendants’
purpose for associating with the case).
118. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
3268634.

304

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 3:284

make informed judgments regarding the merits of the case.119 In other
words, associating with a case simply to intimidate the defendant without
knowing whether the suit has merit would be improper; yet it would be
acceptable to lend your name as co-counsel after ensuring the case is not
wrought with frivolous accusations.
Applying this more reasonable theory to Boucher and Ottilie, neither
assessed the merits of the Bains action, yet both were content to be
associated with the high-profile case for many years.120 This lack of
diligence supports Epstein’s inference that the collaboration was likely for
an improper purpose. Power is a pivotal legal technique and creating the
perception that power is on your side is neither a new nor inherently
improper practice. However, power can have its pitfalls if not exercised
properly. Lending your reputation to a case as co-counsel as a power ploy
does not come without risks. The Cole holding is an instructive lesson as
to why attorneys must become informed as to the merits of the case their
name is associated.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: WHAT IS THE HARM IN LETTING NONPARTICIPATING ATTORNEYS ESCAPE LIABILITY?
Would any harm actually exist in letting these passive attorneys escape
liability? After all, if they were completely removed from the case, and had
a good faith belief it was meritorious, then why should they bear the heavy
burden of other counsel’s mistakes? Furthermore, Cole would not be left
without recourse because the trial court allowed him to proceed against the
lead attorneys, Meyer and Aguirre.121 Cole’s attorneys suggest the
significance of counsel of record would be diminished to mere “window
dressing”; they paint a picture of a hierarchical legal landscape driven by
power ploys couched in trickery rather than justice and ethics:
A rule that the appearance by counsel as counsel of record in California
litigation may legitimately be no more than a form of window dressing
would promote public cynicism regarding attorneys’ performance of their
professional duties. It would surely increase, rather than diminish, the risk
that attorneys will pursue meritless litigation, as the “top gun” co-counsel of
119. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664–66 (reiterating the duties of co-counsel to their clients,
regardless of when their role in the case is triggered).
120. See id. at 666 (“[Boucher] and Ottilie have not shown they had any knowledge of the
claims asserted against Cole in Bains or made any effort to independently investigate and research the
validity of these claims.”). Recall malice can be inferred in many ways, and the defendants’
investigation and research is among them. Id. at 661 (citing Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker,
765 P.2d 498, 506 (Cal. 1989)).
121. See id. at 651 (providing overview of procedural history).
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record rest secure in the knowledge that they will not be held responsible for
the meritlessness of the case, as long as lesser-known co-counsel . . . have
been assigned to do the work.122

Justice Epstein agreed. Attorneys are “required to create a record of
diligence” and ensure that meritorious claims are the basis for the
lawsuit.123 Relaxing this requirement for co-counsel would simply
undercut this policy and result in more cases like this where courts
conclude that parties merely “lent their names to the case with indifference
to its actual merit.”124 Allowing attorneys to escape liability due to their
lack of diligence or willful ignorance is counterintuitive to the legal
profession—esteemed for demanding hours, work ethic, and innovative
ways of thinking. Efficient administration of justice will improve if
attorneys are encouraged to dismiss “meritless claims at the earliest stage
possible.”125 Attorneys and the court system are not the only parties
reaping benefits from the Cole decision. Just as attorneys protect
themselves from malicious prosecution charges, their “client[s] will avoid
the cost of fruitless litigation” and reduce their exposure to liability.126
Should an attorney associate as counsel of record with a case containing
allegations that the world is square, Gandhi is racist, and the Loch Ness
monster actually lives in Justice Scalia’s swimming pool? Of course not.
Requiring attorneys to research the merits of a case prior to associating as
co-counsel not only benefits the client and court, but attorneys reap the
benefit of reputation preservation. After all, as wisely noted by Benjamin
Franklin, “[i]t takes many good deeds to build a reputation, and only one

122. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
3268634.
123. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 666.
124. Id. Contrary to the Cole appellate decision, the trial judge feared requiring attorneys of
record to be familiar with the merits would spark “defensive lawyering.” Appellant’s Opening Brief
at 5–6, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634. Ottilie’s attorney echoed
this concern by deeming it “the legal equivalent to defensive medicine.” See Robert P. Ottilie’s
Respondent’s Brief at 4, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL 5238835 (criticizing
plaintiff’s contentions as ones that “defy logic and good sense” by expounding on possible negative
consequences). However, Cole’s attorneys responded that such an outlook is flawed because it
“subordinates the interest of clients, adversary parties and the judicial system to the economic
interests of attorneys of record in contingent-fee cases in avoiding any familiarity with the matters
until invited by their co-counsel.” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5–6, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646
(No. B227712), 2011 WL 3268634.
125. Zamos v. Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 809–10 (Cal. 2004).
126. Id. at 810. But see id. (summarizing the defendants’ fear that this heightened liability will
inhibit “zealous representation” by diverting attorneys’ attention “to second-guess[ing] the merits of
the litigation” rather than the actual case).
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bad one to lose it.”127
VI. SOLUTIONS FOR AVOIDING CO-COUNSEL CONUNDRUMS
Justice Epstein offered two straightforward ways to “easily avoid liability
for malicious prosecution without having to engage in premature work on
a case.”128 First, attorneys should “refrain from formally associating in [a
case] until their role is triggered.”129 Second, attorneys should “refrain
from lending their names to pleadings or motions about which they know
next to nothing.”130
Aside from Epstein’s explicit suggestions, other observations in the Cole
opinion provide guidance for attorneys. For example, the court noted that
there was “no evidence that [Boucher and Ottilie] objected to service or
notified the court or opposing counsel that they did not actually represent
the Bains plaintiffs.”131 Thus, attorneys must recognize the dangers of
complacency and take steps to avoid costly mistakes. They should be
cognizant of signatures, paperwork, and routine administrative tasks.
Receiving copies of unfamiliar defense filings should be a warning sign. In
response, attorneys should immediately notify opposing counsel and the
court to ensure the co-counsel label does not have devastating ramifications
on their reputation or career.132 Alternatively, Christopher Cole’s
attorney, Leighton M. Anderson, offered his advice to avoid liability: “If
you’re not going to pay any attention to [a case] until it goes to trial, then
don’t associate with it as attorney of record on day one.”133
Another suggestion for avoiding liability was articulated by Judge
Richard Fruin at the trial hearing regarding the defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motions:
First, Mr. Ottilie could have said, Mr. Aguirre, if you need me at trial, I’ll
associate in, and I’ll stand beside you at trial; let me know when that’s in the
offing. He then would not have been on the pleading. Or he could have
127. BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr385547.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
128. Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 666.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 663.
132. See Sycamore Ridge Apts. LLC v. Naumann, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 579 (Ct. App. 2007)
(holding the defendants liable for malicious prosecution and emphasizing the lack of “evidence
indicating that the LaFave defendants took immediate steps to dismiss the meritless claims upon
associating into the case”) (emphasis added).
133. Samson Habte, ‘Standby’ Counsel Who Didn’t Participate May Be Held Liable for Malicious
Prosecution, [2012–2013 Transfer Binder] 28 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 14, at
416 (July 4, 2012), available at www.bna.com/standby-counsel-who-n12884910458/.
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been [co-counsel], and he could have said, Mr. Aguirre, I’m relying on you,
but I have an independent duty; so you tell me what the facts are that
support the filing of this lawsuit, and you update me as long as I’m going to
be on the pleading as [co-counsel] whether or not there’s still sufficient cause
to maintain these claims....134

Attorneys who have a specialized role in a case (such as for trial or on
appeal) can associate with the case at that stage after diligently researching
to ensure that the requisite merits exist.135 Rushing to jump on a
meritless case is unwise, impractical, unethical, and may have devastating
effects on an attorney’s pocketbook and reputation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cole is significant because it illustrates that even miniscule participation
can lead to monstrous liability, simply because of name association as
counsel of record. Perhaps Cole may be understood as a judicial call to
action for attorneys to take accountability for their professional
responsibility, starting with their names. Rather than viewing the decision
as punishing attorneys for the mistakes of other co-counsel, attorneys
should use Cole as guidance regarding bedrock duties—diligently
conducting research, remaining informed, ensuring probable cause exists
for claims, and competently dividing duties while maintaining enough
knowledge to judge other attorneys’ quality of work. Plaintiffs’ attorneys
should become familiar with their duties and evaluate the risks before
lending their names or reputations to a case. Attorneys can still recruit
others to associate with a case for power. At the same time, the allpowerful co-counsel label will not protect attorneys from liability for
malicious prosecution.

134. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 25, Cole, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 646 (No. B227712), 2011 WL
3268634 (citing transcripts from hearings held on August 9, 2010 and August 18, 2010).
135. Id. at 6.

